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Adults Use Distributional Statistics for Word
Learning in a Conservative Way
Suzanne Aussems, and Paul Vogt
Abstract—This study examined how much adults rely on cross-
situational information in word learning by comparing their gaze
behavior in a word learning task with models of four learning
strategies. We manipulated the input type of situations (consec-
utive vs. interleaved) and the co-occurrence frequencies between
words and objects so that adult learners could infer correct word-
object mappings based on cross-situational information. There
are two key findings. First, an exposure-by-exposure analysis of
gaze behavior during the word learning procedure revealed that
most participants collected sufficient cross-situational information
before they developed a preference for one particular word-
object mapping, with consecutive as well as interleaved situations.
Second, a classification approach in which individual gaze behav-
ior was attributed to different word learning strategies showed
that participants relied mostly on a Conservative cross-situational
learning (XSL) strategy, compared to Associative XSL, Propose-
but-Verify, and Random strategies. Adults relied on Conservative
XSL when presented with consecutive and interleaved situations,
but they shifted towards Associative XSL when presented with
interleaved situations.
Keywords—Cross-situational word learning, Propose-but-Verify,
adults, eye tracking, Expectation-Maximization algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, cross-situational learning (XSL) has
played a prominent role in explaining the human ability to
learn words [1]–[12]. In short, XSL is a cognitive mechanism
that allows a learner to infer word-object mappings by col-
lecting information from multiple situations. However, there
is still much debate on how humans apply this mechanism.
This study aims to provide converging evidence regarding the
extent to which adults 1) use cross-situational information for
word learning, 2) engage in guess-and-test behavior during
word learning, and 3) rely on these strategies when words are
presented in consecutive or interleaved situations.
XSL assumes that learners use distributional co-occurrence
statistics of words and objects and consider only those word-
object mappings that occur in most situations [7], [9]. To
illustrate how XSL works, we use the Situations in Fig. 1. If a
cross-situational learner tracks the co-occurrence frequencies
of the novel word and objects across Situations, he could infer
that the upper left object in Situation 1 is the object that
occurs most frequently with the word timilo when he reaches
Situation 4. There is abundant evidence that adults can, and
indeed do, use cross-situational information for word learning
[2]–[5], [8]–[12].
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Situation 1 Situation 2 Situation 3
Situation 4 Situation 5 “TIMILO”
Fig. 1. Overview of a basic cross-situational word learning task. The five
consecutive Situations display objects to which the word “TIMILO” could
refer. Note that these Situations are usually presented to participants one at
a time. The upper left object in Situation 1 appears most frequently across
all five Situations. In fact, this object is the only object that has appeared in
all Situations up to date in Situation 4. Using cross-situational information, a
learner can thus infer that timilo refers to this object. Stimuli were developed
by K. Smith, A. Smith, and Blythe [9].
Test trial with 8 unique objects “Look at the TIMILO”
Fig. 2. Example of a test trial showing the eight unique objects from the
consecutive Situations presented in Fig. 1.
A. Debate on Cross-Situational Learning
Researchers have argued that XSL cannot explain word
learning under natural circumstances. For instance, Trueswell
and colleagues suggested that storing the co-occurrence fre-
quencies of multiple words and objects in human memory
over a period time is so demanding, that XSL may only be
used under greatly simplified circumstances, which are far
simpler than those encountered by a language learner in a
natural environment [13]. To account for this, they introduced a
Propose-but-Verify strategy for word learning which requires
a learner to track only one word-object mapping at a time
[13]–[15]. According to the Propose-but-Verify (PbV) strategy,
a learner quickly proposes a random word-object mapping
when he first encounters a novel word, and he sticks to this
mapping as long as possible. Considering the five Situations
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depicted in Fig. 1, the PbV learner maps the novel word timilo
randomly to one of the objects in Situation 1. If this object
is still in Situation 2-5, the PbV learner sticks to this word-
object mapping. However, if the hypothesized object is no
longer consistent with previous Situations, the learner proposes
another random word-object mapping without any recollection
of the objects occurring in previous Situations. For instance,
the right bottom object in Situation 1 is inconsistent with
Situation 2. A learner who proposed this word-object mapping
in Situation 1, will then select a random object in Situation
2, which could well be the newly introduced object on the
bottom left. The PbV strategy requires a learner to track only
one potential word-object mapping across situations, which is
why this strategy is also called Minimal XSL [9].
B. Cross-Situational Learning or Single Hypthesis Testing?
Strikingly, in most of the studies that argue for a word
learning strategy with a guess-and-test component, the model
was derived from experiments in which participants were asked
to select a word-object mapping in each situation. A forced-
choice paradigm may thus require participants to engage in
guess-and-test learning behavior. We present two lines of
evidence to support this observation. First, the PbV strategy
has been shown to explain word learning data obtained with
a forced-choice word learning procedure. In the study by
Trueswell and colleagues [13], adults were presented with
a procedure in which they were required to pair visually
presented sets of objects with target words on each exposure.
As the sets of objects changed across situations for each
word, the word-object mappings could be inferred from cross-
situational information. Based on an analysis of the partici-
pants’ clicking behavior during the word learning procedure,
however, they found that their participants seemed to make
random guesses when their latest proposal did not re-appear
in the new situation, thus suggesting that they used the PbV
strategy, rather than distributional co-occurrence frequencies
of words and objects. Note that Trueswell et al. [13] also
demonstrate PbV learning behavior with gaze data of adult
learners, but these gaze data were collected during the forced-
choice learning procedure, which may have influenced their
gaze behavior (i.e., participants look where they click).
Second, integrated accounts of PbV and XSL have been
shown to explain word learning data obtained with a forced-
choice procedure. For instance, K. Smith and colleagues [9]
designed a word learning task in which they presented adults
with situations similar to those in Fig. 1. Their participants
either viewed these situations consecutively for each word or
interleaved, that is, the situations for one word were mixed
with situations for other words. Participants were required to
click on the object they thought the word referred to after
each situation. Their clicking behavior was attributed to four
different learning strategies (Pure XSL, Approximate XSL,
and two random baseline strategies) using the Expectation-
Maximization algorithm [16]. They found that participants
adhered to Pure XSL with consecutive situations but shifted
to Approximate XSL with interleaved situations. Similarly,
Yurovsky and colleagues [11] presented adult participants with
a series of situations in which they heard a word, saw a number
of objects, and were asked to guess the correct word-object
mapping by clicking on the object. Their findings are explained
by an integrated approach to XSL in which the learner uses
both a guess-and-test approach and co-occurrence statistics of
words and objects to identify correct word-object mappings.
Following up on this, MacDonald, Yurovsky and Frank [17]
demonstrated that especially when referential uncertainty was
high, adult participants adhered to XSL, while they behaved
more as single hypothesis testers when referential uncertainty
was low. These studies suggest that the degree to which
learners collect cross-situational information depends largely
on the complexity of the task.
A plausible alternative for a forced-choice paradigm is a
vision-based paradigm (e.g., passive look-and-listen or goal-
based vision) [18] in which participants’ gaze behavior pro-
vides an indication of their preference for an object, or multiple
objects, when they hear a target word during the word learning
procedure [12], [19]–[21]. In the study by Koehne and col-
leagues [20], participants were subjected to a passive look-and-
listen paradigm. Participants’ gaze behavior showed that they
were able to distinguish between co-occurrence frequencies of
the different (distractor) objects. However, this was only the
case for objects that were actively selected during the word
learning procedure, or for objects that received particular atten-
tion. Because co-occurrence frequencies were not necessarily
all stored in memory, Koehne et al. [20] argue that there is
a multiple-proposal account at play which corresponds to an
extended PbV account for word learning rather than to XSL.
However, in half of their experimental conditions participants
selected the most likely object (based on cross-situational
information) above chance level when they could not verify
their previous guess. Thus, unlike a strict PbV theory would
predict, learners can memorize more than their most recent
choice. In the study by Koehne et al. [20], in which a vision-
based paradigm was tested as an alternative to forced-choice,
participants’ gaze behavior was analyzed at test, but not during
the training procedure. Based on the studies by Trueswell and
colleagues [13], [20] it thus remains unclear whether learners
use merely PbV or also rely on XSL.
It is plausible that learners could use more conservative
learning strategies, in which they do not guess an initial word-
object mapping, but track the distributional statistics of object
appearances across situations in which a word is heard. This
Conservative XSL strategy allows learners to gradually collect
information to identify a correct word-object mapping, and to
propose a word-object mapping only when sufficient cross-
situational information has been obtained. This strategy is
modeled after the Pure XSL strategy proposed by K. Smith
and colleagues [9]. A conservative cross-situational learner will
therefore not propose a word-object mapping until Situation
4 in Fig. 1, when he can infer that the upper left object
in Situation 4 has appeared more often in the context of
the word timilo than any of the other objects. To test our
Conservative XSL strategy, we conducted a vision-based word
learning experiment in which we tracked the gaze behavior
of adult participants to investigate the development of word-
object mappings in an exposure-by-exposure analysis. This
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method allows us to attribute features key to the learning
process of individual words and participants to Conservative
XSL, Associative XSL, PbV, and a Random strategy.
C. The Present Study
To summarize, previous studies employed a forced-choice
paradigm to investigate word learning strategies, which re-
quired participants to engage in a guess-and-test approach to
word learning [9], [11], [13]. Therefore, it remains unclear to
what extent human learners rely on PbV and cross-situational
information for word learning. In order to investigate this,
we use a vision-based paradigm, which allows participants
to consider multiple word-object mappings during the word
learning procedure without making a forced choice. We adapt
the experimental design of K. Smith and colleagues [9] by
recording participants’ eye gaze during the learning procedure
instead of their clicking behavior. We chose their design,
because it includes input types in which situations for novel
words are presented consecutively or interleaved with situa-
tions for other novel words. This allows us to investigate the
contrasting claims with regard to the influence of consecutive
and interleaved input types on word learning strategies. At
the end of the consecutive and interleaved word learning
procedures we measure participants’ knowledge of the word-
object mappings in test trials that show all unique objects from
the training situations for a given word (see Fig. 2).
In our first analysis, we compare word learning performance
and word learning speed (i.e. the number of exposures needed
to identify the target object for a novel word) between training
sessions that present adult learners with consecutive and in-
terleaved situations (within-subjects manipulation). We predict
participants will learn more words with consecutive than with
interleaved situations. We also expect that participants will
identify the target object earlier in the training procedure with
consecutive than with interleaved situations.
Second, we analyze the gaze behavior during the training
procedures in two ways: our first analysis is similar to the
analysis of Trueswell and colleagues [13] and focuses on
objects that participants prefer after the object they initially
preferred disappears from the context; something we call a
preference-switch-analysis. If participants switch to objects
consistent with cross-situational information more often than
to inconsistent objects in a subsequent situation, then this
indicates they implicitly remembered objects from in previous
situations. This would suggest that participants use cross-
situational information for word learning rather than PbV.
Our third analysis is similar to the analysis of K.
Smith and colleagues [9], who implemented the Expectation-
Maximization algorithm to classify the clicking behavior of
their participants during their word learning procedure based
on models of different learning strategies. In our analysis, we
use gaze behavior to estimate the likelihood of the sequence
of object preferences for exposures to each word and per input
type, given a Random strategy, PbV, Associative XSL, and our
proposed Conservative XSL strategy in which participants do
not focus on one particular object until they have collected suf-
ficient information to disambiguate the target objects from the
distractors. Finally, we classify (combined) learning strategies
per participant and input type of the situations (consecutive vs.
interleaved) to see what type of strategies adult learners use,
and under which memory demands. A consecutive presentation
of situations requires participants to keep less objects in mind
before the final situation of a word is shown than an interleaved
presentation of situations. Therefore, an interleaved input type
poses a higher demand on memory than a consecutive input
type and we expect this to influence the learning behavior.
II. METHOD
A. Design
The experiment used a within-subjects design with input
type (consecutive vs. interleaved) and situations (1-5) as the
independent variables. We adapted the experimental design
of K. Smith and colleagues [9] by reducing the number of
situations for each word from twelve to five and by recording
the gaze behavior of participants during the word learning
procedure instead of their clicking behavior. Each participant
learned four words with each input type of situations and there
were eight test trials in total, four at the end of each input type.
The dependent variable was the looking time towards target
objects in the training situations and test trials.
B. Participants
We collected data from 92 Dutch native speakers (47 fe-
males, 45 males), all students in the Tilburg School of Hu-
manities. Participants received course credit for participation.
Ten participants were excluded from the analyses, because the
eye tracker did not record their eye movements properly. The
final sample consisted of 82 participants (45 females, 37 males)
between 18–30 years old (M = 22.46, SD = 2.72).
C. Materials
Eight novel words were used to label novel objects, follow-
ing Dutch phonotactical rules: toekie, boezie, voolee, wootie,
nieloo, wiepoe, veegoo, reezoo. Rounded and sharp syllables
were balanced in each word to eliminate a potential influence
from sound symbolism on learning behavior [22]. Audio
samples of these words were generated using a female voice
from a Dutch online text-to-speech generator available at
http://www.fluency.nl/international.htm.
Next, 64 pictures of novel objects were randomly selected
from the stimuli set developed by [9]. We created eight sets of
eight objects for each word. One target object was randomly
selected from each set and labeled with one of the novel words.
The remaining stimuli in each set served as distractor objects.
There was no overlap between sets to prevent participants from
using knowledge about one word’s referent to learn the correct
referent of another novel word [23].
Subsequently, we created five situations for each word that
included the target object and three distractor objects on a
2x2 display. Cross-situational information was manipulated by
replacing one of the distractor objects systematically with one
of the other distractor objects in each subsequent situation
[13]. Fig. 1 shows an example set of five situations for the
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word timilo, which illustrates how distractor objects were
organized across situations. The eight sets of situations were
then randomly assigned to the consecutive or interleaved input
types of the word learning procedure.
In the consecutive condition, all five situations for one word
were followed by all five situations for a second, third, and
fourth word. In the interleaved condition, all first situations
for four words were followed by all second, third, fourth, and
fifth situations for these four words. Thus, in the interleaved
condition, participants were shown four additional training
trials, one for each of the other novel words, before they were
shown the second training trial for the initial word. Test trials
followed at the end of each condition and included the sets of
the eight objects for each of the four words on a 2x4 display.
D. Apparatus
A SMI Vision RED 250 remote eye-tracking system was
used for stimuli presentation and data collection. Stimuli were
presented on a 22” computer screen via SMI Experiment Cen-
ter 3.3 and gaze data from the eye-tracker were simultaneously
collected via SMI iView X. Bright lights on both sides of the
computer screen provided optimal calibration.
E. Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a soundproof booth
in the lab. The distance between the participants and the
computer screen was approximately 70 cm. The eye-tracker
was calibrated for each participant using a 9-point calibration
scheme. The experimenter validated if the estimation of the eye
position was indeed close to the known calibration points. If
errors occurred, the calibration session was repeated. After the
experimenter left the booth, participants put on headphones and
started the experiment. They were instructed via the screen to
try and map a heard target word to the correct object, with the
hint that the correct object was always displayed in the context
of a heard word. Note that participants were not explicitly
instructed to use a particular learning strategy.
Participants either completed the consecutive input type or
the interleaved input type first. During the training procedure,
participants were presented with each situation for 5000 ms,
and all situations showed four objects while participants heard
a target word. This duration was chosen to give participants
enough time to scan four objects and was based on a small
pilot study. Test procedures for the consecutive and interleaved
input types followed when trials in each of the input types
had finished. During the test procedures, participants were
presented with the total set of objects for 8000 ms and they
were instructed to focus on the objects that they thought
corresponded to the played novel words. The duration in the
test procedure was increased to allow participants to scan the
eight objects shown (instead of 4 shown in the training phase).
We have made the audio files of the heard novel words
available via Open Science Framework at osf.io/bskeh, and
example video clips of the gaze behavior of one participant as
it was monitored by the eye tracker during the task.
F. Data Analysis
Eye movements of the participants were analyzed using an
Areas of Interest (AOI) approach. Equally-sized AOIs were
drawn around all objects in training and test trials by a human
coder. Looking times included fixations and saccades, which
were assigned manually using the software and procedure by
Cozijn [24]. Looking times for each object were normalized
by dividing them by the total amount of looking time recorded
per situation for each participant, and converted to percentages.
The objects participants looked at for more than 50% of the
time during the test procedures were accepted as the chosen
objects. Participants’ looking times met this threshold in 94.8%
of the test trials in the consecutive condition and 95.4% in the
interleaved condition, suggesting that these generally reflected
a choice when participants were instructed to “Look at the
TIMILO”. If this chosen object indeed corresponded to the
target word, the word-object mapping was considered learned.
The participants were scored one point for each learned word.
If the chosen object did not correspond to the target word, or if
none of the looking times met the >50% threshold, participants
received zero points1. Learning speed was operationalized as
the percentage of time participants spent looking at target
objects in each situation in the training procedures.
Word learning performance in the test trials (0=incorrect,
1=correct) following the consecutive and interleaved input
types were analyzed with a mixed effects logistic regression
analysis with input type as a fixed effect and participant and
word as random effects.
Looking times (in percentages) for target objects during
training were entered into a linear mixed-effects model that
included input type and situation as fixed effects and partici-
pants and words as random effects.
All statistical analyses were carried out with the R soft-
ware [25] using the lme4 package [26]. Visual inspection
of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from
homoscedasticity or normality. In all models, we started off
with a maximal random effects structure including random
slope and intercept variation, and the co-variation between
the two, for participants and words [27]. We compared each
model with updated versions of the model that systematically
excluded each main effect and interaction term of interest using
likelihood ratio tests (χ2). The raw data files, R Markdown
files, and code used for all the analyses and plots in this
paper are available from the Open Science Framework at
osf.io/bskeh.
Finally, we validated our >50% threshold for object prefer-
ence during the training procedures by measuring the agree-
ment between objects that met the threshold in the final
situation for each word in each input type and the objects
that met the threshold in the test procedures. In 82.9% of the
113 out of 656 data points (1.98%) did not meet our >50% threshold of
the looking time and were treated as incorrect responses. The interpretation
of our results is exactly the same with a threshold of >60% or >70% of
the looking time. We checked these stricter thresholds because one could
argue that looking times split between just two objects (49% vs. 51%) hardly
indicate a preference for one of those objects. However, as their were four
objects shown in each situation, differences smaller than 10% between objects
that received the longest looking times occurred in less than 1% of our data.
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final situations in the consecutive input type, and in 64.3%
of the interleaved input type, participants showed a preference
according to our threshold. Of these preferences, 83.1% of the
preferred objects in the consecutive condition, and 75.4% in the
interleaved condition, corresponded to objects that participants
focused on in the test procedures. Our threshold thus identified
objects that participants preferred at the end of the training
procedures and in the test procedures.
G. Preference-Switch-Analysis
For the preference-switch-analysis, we first coded the situ-
ations of the training procedures in which one of the objects
received more than 50% of the looking time. The threshold
of more than 50% of the looking time for one object was
chosen as it entails that participants could not have looked
longer at any of the other objects. We extracted information
about when a first object preference occurred across the
five situations. Second, we coded whether the objects that
participants preferred had appeared in all situations so far (i.e.,
whether the object was still in the potential set of objects
that could refer to the target word). Third, we coded whether
participants switched from one preference to another (e.g.,
from >50% looking time for object A to >50% looking time
to object B in the next situation). Fourth, we coded switches
to objects that had appeared in all situations so far. Finally,
the objects to which participants switched were coded based
on the situation in which they had first appeared, and based
on how many subsequent instances they continued to appear.
All these binary (1=switch, 0=no switch) dependent variables
were entered into separate logistic regression analyses using
models that controlled for a maximal random effects structure
of participant and item variability where possible [27].
H. Expectation-Maximization Algorithm
The expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [16] is an
iterative classification method for finding the maximum likeli-
hood or maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of parameters
in statistical models, where the models depend on latent
variables in addition to unknown parameters and known data
observations. K. Smith and colleagues [9] used this method
to estimate the likelihood that a particular word learning
strategy explains the clicking behavior of their participants
during the training procedure. We adapted their analysis to
accommodate our experimental paradigm, which differs on two
major accounts: 1) we analyzed sequences of gaze behavior
instead of clicking behavior, and 2) our analysis only included
looking times for objects presented in the context, whereas in
the study by K. Smith and colleagues [9] participants were
asked to also choose among potential objects that were not
shown in the context, but appeared in a test trial after each
situation.
Let d be the sequence of actions taken by a participant in
subsequent situations of a given word, then the likelihood that,
given strategy h, we observe this sequence is P (d|h), where
P (d|h) =
tmax∏
i=1
p(di|h, , . . .), (1)
in which p(di|h, , . . .) is the probability of behavior di at
instance i, given strategy h, error parameter , and additional
elements that describe the history of instances. We identify
two typical gaze behaviors: 1) Participants’ looking time for
one object, mθ,i, in the context Ci exceeds our threshold of
θ = 50% of the looking time. We denote this behavior by
di = mθ,i, where mθ,i ∈ Ci. 2) Participants do not look at an
object for more than 50% of the time, but instead divide their
looking time over all objects in the context Ci. We denote this
behavior by di 6= mθ,i.
In our classification, we attribute sequences of gaze behavior
to one of four learning strategies: a Random strategy, PbV,
Associative XSL, and Conservative XSL. The probability
functions of these strategies are below.
In calculating these probabilities, the error  accounts for
the probability that the observed behavior is inconsistent
with the strategy under consideration. In other words, when
calculating the probability for a specific learning strategy (e.g.,
Conservative XSL), the observed sequence of gaze behavior
may not consistently follow the expected gaze behavior for this
strategy, but there is a probability  that this participant did use
the given strategy, but with some error. For example, when the
participant fixated on an object for longer than 50% of the time,
this participant did not correctly apply the Conservative XSL
strategy. However, this person would have correctly applied
any of the other three strategies. The error  accounts for
the possibility that this participant would, overall, use the
Conservative XSL strategy and not another strategy. The EM
algorithm estimates the value of .
Random: is when a participant prefers to look at one object
from the context C with an equal probability:
p(di|Random) =
{
(1− ) 1|Ci| , if di = mθ,i
 1|Ci| , if di 6= mθ,i,
(2)
where Ci is the set of objects in the context on instance
i, and |Ci| its size. In our experiment, we always presented
participants with four objects, so |Ci| = 4. When a participant
did not look at an object for more than 50% of the time, we
assumed he did not apply the Random strategy. In this case,
the probability is taken to be equal to  times the a priori
probability for looking at an object.
Propose-but-Verify (PbV): is the guess-and-test strategy pro-
posed by [13] in which participants show an early preference,
track the object that they preferred and look at this object again
in case it re-appears in the context Ci. If participants’ previous
preference, di−1 = mθ,i−1, does not re-appear in the present
context, they randomly select a new object of preference. We
attribute the following probability function to this strategy:
p(di|PbV) =

(1− ), if di = mθ,i and mθ,i = mθ,i−1
(1− ) 1|Ci| , if di = mθ,i and mθ,i−1 6∈ Ci
 1|Ci−1| , if di = mθ,i;mθ,i−1 ∈ Ci and mθ,i 6= mθ,i−1
 1|Ci| , if di 6= mθ,i.
(3)
The first two cases account for scenarios in which the strat-
egy is correctly applied (with probability 1− ). If the object
that a participant preferred on instance i − 1, mθ,i−1, occurs
on instance i, the participant is expected to prefer that object
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again (first case in Equation 3). If this object does not re-appear
in the present context, Ci, then the participant is expected
to prefer an object from the context with equal probability
(second case). The other two cases describe scenarios in which
PbV is incorrectly applied: The previously preferred object is
in the context, but the participant prefers another object (third
case) or no specific object (final case).
Associative XSL: is the guess-and-test XSL approach pro-
posed by K. Smith and colleagues [9] and Yurovsky and
colleagues [11]. In this approach, the participant needs to
keep track of the frequencies fmθ,i with which mapping mθ,i
occurred in all i trials up to date. Following K. Smith and
colleagues [9], we define the probabilities of the participant’s
gaze behavior as:
p(di|Assoc. XSL) =

(1− ), if di = mθ,i and mθ,i = mθ,i−1
(1− ) fmθ,i∑
o∈Ci fo,i
, if di = mθ,i and mθ,i−1 6∈ Ci
 1|Ci−1| , if di = mθ,i,mθ,i−1 ∈ Ci and mθ,i 6= mθ,i−1
 1|Ci| , if di 6= mθ,i.
(4)
The first two cases, when the strategy is correctly applied,
are the same as for PbV, but the assignment of the proba-
bility in the second case is now based on the co-occurrence
frequencies of words and objects to fit with the Associative
XSL account. So, when the previously proposed object is
no longer in the context, we assume that participants prefer
to look at each object proportionally to the frequency with
which that object has occurred. The final two cases occur when
Associative XSL is incorrectly applied. These conditions are
the same as for PbV and we assume that the probabilities of
looking at an object are the same as well.
Conservative XSL: is the strategy in which we assume that
participants do not look at a particular object for more than
50% of the time until a single object can be identified as the
target. This strategy is modeled after Pure XSL by K. Smith
and colleagues [9]
p(di|Cons. XSL) =

(1− ) fmmax .i,i∑
m∈Ci fm,i
, if di 6= mθ,i and i ≤ 3
(1− ), if di = mθ,i;mθ,i = mmax,i and i > 3

fmθ,i,i∑
o∈Ci fo,i
, if di = mθ,i and i ≤ 3; or
if di = mθ,i;mθ,i 6= mmaxm,i and i > 3
 1|Ci| , if di 6= mθ,i and i > 3.
(5)
The first two cases describe scenarios in which participants
applied Conservative XSL correctly. During the first three
situations (first case), the target cannot be disambiguated from
the distractors, and participants are not expected to look at
one object for more than 50% of the time. Instead, they
divide their attention over all the objects in the context. To
be conservative in attributing a probability, we attribute a
probability proportional to the frequency, fmmax,i,i, of that
object on which participants fixated longest, i.e., mmax,i =
argmaxm fm,i. The second case describes a scenario in which
only one object (the target) has occurred in most contexts so
far, and the participant has looked at this object. The final
two cases describe the scenarios in which Conservative XSL
was incorrectly applied. When the participant prefers an object
during the first three situations (case 3a), he has developed
a premature preference. The participant also does not apply
Conservative XSL if he looks at a distractor during the fourth
and/or fifth situation (case 3b). Finally, Conservative XSL is
incorrectly applied if the participant did not prefer an object
when the target could be identified (in situation four and five).
In all equations, we allowed participants to make an error with
probability , which we assume is the same for all strategies,
individual learners, and words, but may vary between the two
input types. Still following [9], we applied Bayes’ rule to
calculate the posterior probability that an individual i generated
the data Di during the experiment by following strategy h,
averaged over all W words the participant was exposed to,
i.e.:
P (h|Di, ) = 1
W
W∑
n=1
P (Di,n|h, )P (h)∑
h′ P (Di,n|h′, )P (h′)
, (6)
where Di,n is the data produced when learning word n, P (h)
is the prior probability that the participant used strategy h, and
where the sum in the denominator is over all four strategies
defined above. In this equation, the value of  and the different
priors are unknown, and we use the EM algorithm to estimate
these values.
To obtain the best estimates of these parameters, we itera-
tively applied the EM algorithm to re-estimate these parameters
until the parameters stopped changing more than a small value,
δ. Following K. Smith and colleagues [9] and Griffiths and
colleagues [28], each iteration consisted of two steps:
1) Expectation step: We used previous estimates of  and
P (h) to calculate a posterior probability distribution
over the four strategies that the N participants used,
averaged over the four words per input type (Eq. 6).
2) Maximization step: We then used these values to re-
estimate  and P (h) using:
P̂ (h) =
∑N
i=1 P (h|Di|)
N
(7)
̂ = argmax

N∑
i=1
∑
h
P (h|Di, ) logP (Di|h, ). (8)
Initial values of  and P (h) are arbitrary. Following [9],
we varied  from 0 to 1 with increments of 0.001 to re-
estimate  as in Equation (8). The algorithm’s loop was iterated
until the differences between the new and old estimates for
each parameter were smaller than δ = 0.001. Finally, the
strategy with the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) was
assigned to the gaze behavior for a given word, or participant.
III. RESULTS
A. General Findings
Table I shows the frequency distributions of the number
of words identified correctly during the test procedures. De-
scriptively, participants learned all four words more often with
consecutive than with interleaved situations.
We predicted the participants’ accuracy of identifying word
meanings in the test procedures with a glmer model that
included input type as fixed effect and participant and word
as random effects. Order of input type was originally included
as a random effect, but dropped from the model because it
had so little influence on the estimate of the fixed effect
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TABLE I. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE
NUMBER OF WORDS PARTICIPANTS LEARNED IN THE
CONSECUTIVE AND INTERLEAVED INPUT TYPES OF THE
WORD LEARNING PROCEDURE.
No. of words No. of participants
Consecutive % Interleaved %
0 1 1.2 1 1.2
1 1 1.2 13 15.9
2 10 12.2 22 26.8
3 22 26.8 22 26.8
4 48 58.6 24 29.3
Total 82 100.0 82 100.0
that it caused the model not to converge. The proportion of
word meanings correctly identified in the test was significantly
higher when the participants were trained with consecutive
situations (M = 0.85, SD = 0.36) than with interleaved
situations (M = 0.67, SD = 0.47), χ2(1) = 10.62, p = .001.
Fig. 3. Normalized looking times for target objects (in percentages on the
y-axis) across situations (x-axis) in the consecutive and interleaved input types
(shapes) of the training. Data are collapsed across four words in each input
type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the means.
Fig. 3 shows the average time (%) that participants looked at
the target objects across consecutive and interleaved situations.
We predicted participants’ looking times towards target objects
in the training procedures using an lmer model that included
input type and situation as fixed effects and participant and
word as random effects. There was a significant interaction
effect between input type and situation, on average looking
times for target objects, χ2(1) = 49.46, p < .001. Bonferroni
corrected post-hoc tests revealed no significant difference
between the consecutive and interleaved input types in first,
second, and third situations (p > .05). However, there was
a significant difference between the two input types in fourth
and fifth situations (p < .001), indicating that participants were
more likely to look at target objects in these situations in the
consecutive condition than in the interleaved condition.
B. Preference-Switch-Analysis
TABLE II. FREQUENCIES OF FIRST PREFERENCES (FP) AND SWITCHES
MADE BY PARTICIPANTS BY INPUT TYPE AND SITUATION. IT IS SPECIFIED
HOW OFTEN THESE FIRST PREFERENCES AND SWITCHES INVOLVED AN
OBJECT THAT WAS IN THE SET OF MOST FREQUENTLY SHOWN OBJECTS IN
ALL SITUATIONS UP TO DATE (K).
Consecutive Interleaved
Situation FP In K Switch In K FP In K Switch In K
1 64 64 – – 72 72 – –
2 55 49 10 10 70 62 12 12
3 59 55 24 19 67 56 19 15
4 103 92 37 33 58 43 34 21
5 29 29 8 3 32 30 13 6
Total 310 289 79 65 299 263 78 54
Note. It was impossible to switch preferences in Situation 1, as this was the first
exposure to a word.
In the first part of our preference-switch-analysis, we an-
alyzed the preferences participants developed in the training
procedures of the word learning task. In each input type
(consecutive vs. interleaved), all 82 participants were trained
on four different words, adding up to a total of 328 training
sessions (i.e., sequences of five situations for a target word).
Table II shows per input type in which situation of a training
session a first preference was identified by the >50% threshold
of looking time. In both input types, participants developed a
first preference in the first situation in approximately 20% of
all training sessions, indicating that participants generally did
not start a training session by using a guess-and-test approach.
First preferences were entered into a glmer model with
input type and situation as fixed effects and participant and
word as random effects. We asked whether participants de-
veloped a preference during training, and if so, in which
situation this first preference occurred. There was a significant
interaction effect between input type and situation on first
preferences, χ2(4) = 20.21, p < .001. Bonferroni-corrected
post-hoc tests revealed that participants were more likely to
show a first preference in fourth consecutive situations than in
fourth interleaved situations (p < .001). Taking into account
the numbers in Table II, this finding suggests that participants
were more conservative in developing a first preference in
consecutive situations than in interleaved situations. Every
fourth situation provided participants with sufficient cross-
situational information to distinguish the target objects from
the distractors (see Fig 1). An analysis of first preferences
for objects that appeared most frequently in all situations
up to date, K, could tell us whether participants were more
conservative with consecutive than with interleaved situations
because they were collecting this information.
We first note that the vast majority of first preferences
involved objects consistent with cross-situational information
(93.2% in the consecutive condition and 88.0% in the in-
terleaved condition). Again, an interaction effect between
input type and situation was found when first preferences for
objects in most contexts so far were entered into the analysis,
χ2(4) = 23.78, p < .001. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests
revealed that also for objects that appeared most frequently
in all situations up to date, participants were more likely to
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show a first preference in fourth consecutive situations than in
fourth interleaved situations (p < .001). This finding suggests
that participants collected more cross-situational information
from consecutive situations than from interleaved situations.
In the second part of our analysis, we analyzed whether par-
ticipants switched from preferring one object to another object
in a subsequent situation according to the >50% threshold of
looking time. Table II shows the number of training sessions
in which participants made a switch in a given situation.
Switch data were entered into a glmer model analysis
with input type and situation as fixed effects and participant
and word as random effects. We asked whether participants
switched preferences during training, and if so, in which
situations these switches occurred. The main effect of situation
on switches was significant, χ2(4) = 122.36, p < .001, but
not the main effect of input type, χ2(1) = 0.52, p = .469, or
the interaction, χ2(4) = 2.78, p = .596. Bonferroni-corrected
post-hoc tests revealed that participants were more likely to
switch in fourth situations than in any of the other situations
(p < .01). Additionally, participants were less likely to switch
in fifth situations than in third situations (p = .039). The
fact that participants were more likely to switch in the fourth
situation than in any of the other situations suggests that even
learners who developed a premature preference used cross-
situational information to switch preferences, because this is
the situation in which they could have collected a sufficient
amount of cross-situational information to distinguish the
target objects from the distractors. An analysis of switches
to objects that appeared most frequently in all situations up
to date, K, could point out whether these participants were
collecting cross-situational information.
The vast majority of switches, too, involved objects consis-
tent with the available cross-situational information (86.5% for
the consecutive condition and 77.6% for the interleaved condi-
tion). We found a similar pattern when switch data for objects
that appeared most frequently in all situations up to date, K,
were entered into the analysis. The main effect of situation on
switches made to objects that appeared most frequently in all
situations up to date was significant, χ2(4) = 98.26, p < .001,
but not the main effect of input type, χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .935,
or the interaction, χ2(4) = 4.13, p = .389. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc tests revealed that participants were more
likely to switch in fourth situations than in any other situations
(p < .05). Additionally, participants were less likely to switch
in fifth situations than in third situations (p = .002). The
low number of switches made in the word learning procedure
speaks to the relatively low number of participants that adhered
to a guess-and-test strategy for word learning. So far, the
findings suggest that even those participants who adhered
to a guess-and-test strategy used cross-situational information
during training.
In the final part of our preference-switch-analysis, we an-
alyzed the objects that participants preferred after they made
a switch. We asked whether participants were more likely to
switch to target objects than to distractor objects. Table III
shows the frequency with which participants switched to the
different objects per input type.
Switches to different objects were entered into a glmer
TABLE III. SWITCH FREQUENCIES FOR OBJECTS SHOWN
DURING THE TRAINING SESSIONS.
Consecutive Interleaved
Object N N
1 = target 46 41
2 = distractor in Situation 1, 2 and 3 15 11
3 = distractor in Situation 1 and 2 4 2
4 = distractor in Situation 1 – –
5 = distractor in Situation 2, 3 and 4 0 0
6 = distractor in Situation 3, 4 and 5 9 14
7 = distractor in Situation 4 and 5 5 10
8 = distractor in Situation 5 0 0
Total 79 78
Note. It was impossible to switch to Object 4 as it appeared only in
Situation 1.
model with input type and object as fixed effects and partici-
pant as random effect. The main effect of object on switches
was significant, χ2(1) = 308.99, p < .001, but not the main
effect of input type, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .999, or the interaction,
χ2(7) = 5.17, p = .639. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests
indicated that participants were generally more likely to switch
to target objects than to any of the distractors (p < .001 for
all comparisons).
C. Classification of Learning Strategies Based on Gaze
Table IV summarizes the findings of the EM algorithm,
which we implemented to classify learning strategies per
training session for each word (i.e., each sequence of five
situations for a target word). In both the consecutive and
interleaved input types, none of the participants used the
Random strategy or the PbV strategy. In the consecutive
input type, the classifier identified that participants used the
Associative XSL for 8.54% of the 328 training sessions and
Conservative XSL for 91.46% of the training sessions. In the
interleaved input type, participants used the Associative XSL
for 14.49% of the sessions and Conservative XSL for 85.06%
of the sessions.
TABLE IV. CLASSIFICATION OF STRATEGIES BY WORD AND
INPUT TYPE WITH THE EXPECTATION-MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM.
Consecutive Interleaved
Prior N(%) Prior N(%)
 = .097  = .175
Random .000 0 (0.00) .000 0 (0.00)
Propose-but-Verify .013 0 (0.00) .055 0 (0.00)
Associative XSL .143 28 (8.54) .381 49 (14.94)
Conservative XSL .844 300 (91.46) .565 279 (85.06)
min MAP .608 .493
avg MAP .968 .923
Total 328 (100.0) 328 (100.0)
Looking at the strategies that individual participants used,
we found that the vast majority of participants relied almost
exclusively on Conservative XSL in both input types (see
Table V). However, participants did not always use one specific
learning strategy for all the words. In the consecutive condi-
tion, only two participants relied solely on Associative XSL
and 12 participants used both Associative XSL and Conserva-
tive XSL. In the interleaved condition, three participants relied
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exclusively on Associative XSL and 23 participants relied on
both Associative XSL and Conservative XSL.
TABLE V. CLASSIFICATION OF (COMBINED) LEARNING
STRATEGIES PER PARTICIPANT AND INPUT TYPE USING THE
EXPECTATION-MAXIMIZATION ALGORITHM.
Consecutive Interleaved
N(%) N(%)
Associative XSL 2 (2.44) 3 (3.66)
Conservative XSL 68 (82.93) 56 (68.29)
Associative XSL & Conservative XSL 12 (14.63) 23 (28.05)
Total 82 (100.0) 82 (100.0)
Note. The Random and PbV strategies were omitted from the table,
since the EM did not find any occurrences of them.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we investigated how much adults rely on cross-
situational information for word learning by comparing their
gaze behavior with models of four learning strategies. To this
aim, we designed an experiment in which participants learned
word-object mappings in training sessions with both consec-
utive and interleaved situations, while we tracked their eye
movements—a method that has proven adequate for studying
this kind of learning behavior [29]. Our main questions are:
To what extent do adults 1) use cross-situational information
for word learning, 2) apply a guess-and-test strategy during
learning, and 3) rely on these strategies when words are pre-
sented in consecutive or interleaved sequences of situations. To
summarize, our analyses indicate that some adult learners used
a guess-and-test strategy for word learning, but generally they
relied on distributional co-occurrence frequencies of words and
objects in the word learning task, and they were conservative in
developing a preference for a particular word-object mapping.
Adults showed to use Conservative XSL when presented with
consecutive and interleaved situations, but they shifted towards
Associative XSL when presented with interleaved situations.
These conclusions are based on three analyses. Our first
analysis showed that participants learned words in our exper-
iment well above chance in both conditions, but they learned
more words with consecutive situations than with interleaved
situations. This finding is consistent with findings from K.
Smith and colleagues [9], who found that fewer participants
could learn all words with interleaved situations than with
consecutive situations, and that learning took them longer with
interleaved than with consecutive situations. Our analysis of
gaze behavior for target objects during the training procedure
clearly shows that participants appeared more confident about
the correct word-object mapping after the third situation in the
consecutive condition than in the interleaved condition. This
finding suggests that participants learned words faster in the
consecutive condition than in the interleaved condition in our
experiment too. The difference between the consecutive and
interleaved input types is best explained by the fact that cross-
situational information was presented sequentially, one word at
a time, in the consecutive condition, but sequentially in parallel
for all words simultaneously in the interleaved condition, thus
demanding less memory resources.
Second, our preference-switch analysis demonstrates that
participants often did not show a preference for an object be-
fore they had collected sufficient cross-situational information
to disambiguate the target object from the distractors. Hence,
participants generally did not use a guess-and-test strategy
for word learning. In both the consecutive and interleaved
input types, participants revealed a preference for an object
in only 20% of the first situations. In the consecutive input
type, this number gradually increased until situations in which
participants could have collected sufficient information to dis-
ambiguate the target objects. Participants developed premature
guesses more often in the interleaved input type, but not
necessarily in first situations. Thus, participants seem to use
more conservative learning strategies than accounts with a
guess-and-test component would predict. This is inconsistent
with findings from studies that employed a forced-choice
paradigm in which this conservative behavior could not be
detected [5], [9], [11], [13].
Additionally, the preference-switch analysis showed that
participants who switched preferences did not switch to a ran-
dom object as PbV would predict, but predominantly switched
to an object that was most frequently presented in the situations
up to date. Moreover, participants were most likely to switch
preferences at the exact time in the procedure where they
could have distinguished the target objects from the distractors.
Furthermore, participants preferred target objects over any
of the distractor objects when they switched preferences,
regardless of whether they were presented with consecutive or
interleaved situations. In contrast to Trueswell and colleagues
[13], our analyses thus show that participants have implicit
memory of objects that have been presented frequently in
previous situations. This additional finding suggests that adults
in our experiment tracked the co-occurrence frequencies of
words and objects during the word learning procedure in both
the consecutive and interleaved input types. Findings from
our preference-switch analysis are generally consistent with
a XSL account for word learning. In cases where participants
developed a premature guess for a word-object mapping, they
updated this guess with cross-situational information, which
corresponds to XSL rather than PbV.
Third, we used the expectation-maximization algorithm to
attribute gaze behavior during the training procedure to differ-
ent word learning strategies. The EM algorithm attributed most
gaze behaviors to Associative XSL and Conservative XSL.
Strikingly, none of the gaze behaviors were attributed to PbV.
The vast majority of gaze behaviors were attributed to Conser-
vative XSL and participants appeared to rely on this strategy
more strongly in the consecutive than interleaved condition,
which is consistent with the findings from our preference-
switch analysis. This is also in line with findings from [9],
who found that participants switched to a less demanding XSL
strategy when presented with interleaved situations.
The finding that our classifier identified the use of both
Associative XSL and Conservative XSL is consistent with
findings from K. Smith and colleagues [9], however they
did not include Conservative XSL in their classification, but
Pure XSL. Their EM analysis showed that participants relied
on both Associative XSL and Pure XSL in the consecutive
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condition and that they switched to Associative XSL in the
interleaved condition. In addition, their classifier identified that
some of their participants used a Random strategy. We think
that this may indicate an occasional reliance on PbV, but K.
Smith and colleagues [9] did not consider PbV (Minimal XSL
in their study) to be a viable strategy and therefore excluded
it from their classification analysis.
Some participants used a combination of word learning
strategies, which is consistent with the hybrid XSL account
developed by Yurovsky and colleagues [11], [17]. Their studies
showed that learners tend to use a guess-and-test strategy sim-
ilar to PbV when presented with a low number of distractors,
but that they keep track of the distributional co-occurrence
statistics of words and objects when they are presented with a
high number of distractors, similar to Conservative XSL and
Associative XSL. They argue that the underlying cognitive
model is the same, but the differences they found were due
to graded differences in memory and attention constraints.
Yurovsky and colleagues [11], [17] manipulated the number of
distractors shown in situations, but we manipulated the input
type of situations in our experiment following K. Smith and
colleagues [9]. Based on our experiment, a similar argument
can be made that in the consecutive condition, which is less
complex, learners rely more on Conservative XSL than in the
more complex interleaved condition.
Trueswell and colleagues [13] suggested that XSL may be
only be a plausible strategy for word learning under greatly
simplified circumstances, and that human learners would rely
on PbV with more natural, interleaved instances. Our findings
suggest that participants who rely on a guess-and-test strategy
in the interleaved condition, use cross-situational information
to update their word-object mappings rather than PbV. XSL
thus seems a plausible strategy even for learning with inter-
leaved situations.
Our analyses are based on gaze behavior, which we recorded
using a vision-based paradigm. We argue that the reason we
did not observe guess-and-test learning behaviors as often as
in previous research [13]–[15] is because participants were not
forced to make a choice during the training procedure. Our
finding that participants can learn words using cross-situational
information in this way are in line with other studies that used
a vision-based paradigm [12], [19], [21].
One could argue that a vision-based paradigm does not
measure whether or not people developed a preference for an
object. However, other studies have validated this approach
and consider it reliable [12], [19]–[21]. We assumed that
participants developed a preference for an object when they
looked at that object for more than 50% of the time during
a situation in the training procedure. Our validation of this
approach revealed that participants generally chose objects in
the test procedure which received more than 50% of their
looking time at the end of the training procedure. This indicates
that our interpretations of the findings are valid within the
scope of this experiment.
It is, of course, important to ask how these findings gen-
eralize to more realistic word learning contexts, where ref-
erential uncertainty may be much more complex and where
target referents may not be present in the hear-and-now. It is
theoretically implausible that XSL is the sole learning mecha-
nism under continuously high levels of referential uncertainty
[30]. Referential uncertainty must be reduced, for instance by
applying heuristics using social cues (e.g., eye gaze, pointing),
cognitive and pragmatic constraints (e.g., whole object bias,
mutual exclusivity, principle of contrast), and sentential con-
straints [31]–[34]. However, such heuristic can be considered
as mechanisms to reduce referential uncertainty, after which
XSL learning can be applied [35]. When uncertainty becomes
very low or when a learner is forced to make a choice, he or
she may use a guess-and-test strategy (cf. [17]). Otherwise, the
Conservative XSL strategy is a likely candidate.
One of the assumptions of XSL is that the referents of
words are present in the contexts in which these words are
heard. Learners in real life, however, will come to learn that
sometimes the referent of a word is not present. This kind of
noise hampers XSL, but various computational studies (e.g.,
[7], [36]) have shown that XSL can deal with this, as long
as this occurs occasionally. If it would occur regularly, then
additional heuristics would become essential, but it would still
not invalidate XSL as an underlying learning mechanism that
can be used. Pointing gestures can help narrow down the
context of possible word referents, even when the referent of
a word is absent. For instance, abstract deictic gestures [37]
indicate seemingly empty locations in the gesture space to refer
to what used to be there or to refer back to entities that were
temporarily assigned this location during discourse.
It is also important to discuss how our findings generalize to
young word learners. There is abundant evidence that children
can and do use XSL [38]–[40], but it is yet unclear whether
and to what extent they would apply Conservative XSL or
a guess-and-test strategy. Some of the work by L. Smith
and colleagues suggest that, especially for toddlers, parents
naturally label a novel object when this object is in the child’s
view, which reduces referential uncertainty considerably [41].
Similarly, when young children point to entities in their direct
environment, parents often label the things that children are
already paying attention to, which also considerably narrows
down the context of possible referents for spoken words [42].
Future research could investigate to what extent Conservative
XSL or guess-and-test strategies interact with these social
learning mechanisms.
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, our study shows that adult learners use cross-
situational information for word learning. They are rather
conservative in developing preferences for particular word-
object mappings, and do not often engage in guess-and-test
behavior. Adults use cross-situational information regardless of
whether word learning situations are presented consecutively
or interleaved with situations for other words. However, they
tend to shift from Conservative XSL to Associative XSL when
they are presented with interleaved situations.
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